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We have jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1257 only if the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision implicates a federal right. See Griffith, supra, at 322. There are instances in which a substantive change in the law must be attended by a procedure that enables a prisoner to show that he falls within the category of persons whom the law may no longer punish.  To be sure, Miller’s holding has a procedural component.  The category of substantive rules discussed in Teague originated in Justice Harlan’s approach to retroactivity. if the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes.” Id., at 376–377. The majority says that there is no “possibility of a valid result” when a new substantive rule is not applied retroactively. 882. S. Kyle Duncan for the respondent Facts of the case In 1963, Henry Montgomery was found guilty and received the death penalty for the murder of Charles Hunt, which Montgomery committed less than two weeks after he turned 17. On the issue of whether Miller rendered life-without-parole penalties unconstitutional, it is impossible to get past Miller’s unambiguous statement that “[o]ur decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders” and “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process . . . Until today, no federal court was constitutionally obliged to grant relief for the past violation of a newly announced substantive rule. Only when state courts have chosen to entertain a federal claim can the Supremacy Clause conceivably command a state court to apply federal law. But under our precedents “a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines . . . That line of finality demarcating the constitutionally required rule in Griffith from the habeas rule in Teague supplies the answer to the not-so-difficult question whether a state postconviction court must remedy the violation of a new substantive rule: No. Kelsey Ferguson is a J.D. See Brief for Petitioner, Henry Montgomery at 3. Relying on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, and Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, Miller recognized that children differ from adults in their “diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” 567 U. S., at ___, and that these distinctions “diminish the penological justifications” for imposing life without parole on juvenile offenders, id., at ___. It is true, if no writ of error lies, the judgment may be final, in the sense that there may be no means of reversing it. He has ably discharged his assigned responsibilities.   (a) Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, a federal habeas case, set forth a framework for the retroactive application of a new constitutional rule to convictions that were final when the new rule was announced. But the whole controversy here arises because many think there is a valid result when a defendant has been convicted under the law that existed when his conviction became final. 930.3. Miller’s conclusion that the sentence of life without parole is disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders raises a grave risk that many are being held in violation of the Constitution. Alternatively, the Court wrote that states “may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”, Importantly, states must provide an opportunity for release “to those who demonstrate the truth of Miller‘s central intuition — that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change.”, Stevenson: Judicial Sentencing Decision About Fairness, 122 Commerce Street Montgomery, AL 36104  2. Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juvenile  offenders announced a new substantive rule that, under the Constitution, is retroactive in cases on state collateral review. That this finding is not required, however, speaks only to the degree of procedure Miller mandated in order to implement its substantive guarantee.  The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 304, 340–341, 344 (1816); see also Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211, 218 (1988) (when a State has not “placed any limit on the issues that it will entertain in collateral proceedings . . . Penry, supra, at 330; see also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Although Teague describes new substantive rules as an exception to the bar on retroactive application of procedural rules, this Court has recognized that substantive rules “are more accurately characterized as . . . The petitioner’s sub- missions are relevant, however, as an example of one kind of evidence that prisoners might use to demonstrate rehabilitation. And here it confronts a second obstacle to its desired outcome. right to enforce federal laws against the States.” Armstrong, 575 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). The Court wrote that requiring sentencers to consider “children’s diminished culpability, and heightened capacity for change” should make such sentences “uncommon.”. In 2016, the Supreme Court did so in Montgomery v. Louisiana, holding that Miller announced a substantive rule to be applied retroactively in cases on collateral review. Cf. In Louisiana there are two principal mechanisms for collateral challenge to the lawfulness of imprisonment. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. Melinie v. State, 93–1380 (La. Ann., Arts. Miller, the opinion it wishes to impose upon state postconviction courts, simply does not decree what the first part of the majority’s opinion says Teague’s first exception requires to be given retroactive effect: a rule “set[ting] forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.” Ante, at 9 (emphasis added). The Court now holds that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule. Linkletter began with the premise “that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision  retrospectively” and went on to adopt an equitable rule-by-rule approach to retroactivity, considering “the prior his- tory of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Id., at 629.  The Linkletter framework proved unworkable when the Court began applying the rule-by-rule approach not only to cases on collateral review but also to cases on direct review, rejecting any distinction “between convictions now final” and “convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 300 (1967). and certainly does not establish any right to collaterally attack a final judgment of conviction.” United States v. MacCollom, 426 U. S. 317, 323 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide [postconviction] relief”). 3d 829, 841, with Diatchenko v. District Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass.  In the ordinary course Louisiana courts will not consider a challenge to a disproportionate sentence on collateral review; rather, as a general matter, it appears that prisoners must raise Eighth Amendment sentencing chal- lenges on direct review. As Justice Cardozo said, ‘We think the Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject’ ”).  The other sleight of hand performed by the majority is its emphasis on Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880). Montgomery invoked this procedure in the East Baton Rouge Parish District Court. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292 (1992). However, neither Teague nor Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264—which concerned only Teague’s general retroactivity bar for new constitutional rules of criminal procedure—had occasion to address whether States are required as a constitutional matter to give retroactive effect to new substantive rules. 552 U. S., at 266. It insists that Miller barred life-without-parole sentences “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. “By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence,” mandatory life without parole “poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17). This was an appeal by the father from the dismissal of his application for a reduction or elimination of spousal and child support. That condition is satisfied, the Court holds, because the Constitution purportedly requires state and federal postconviction courts to give “retroactive effect” to new substantive constitutional rules by applying them to overturn long-final convictions and sentences. Ante, at 9. See, e.g., State v. Shaffer, 2011–1756, pp. The same logic governs a challenge to a punishment that the Constitution deprives States of authority to impose, Penry, supra, at 330. Accordingly, the issue in this case is not whether prisoners who received mandatory life-without-parole sentences for crimes they committed decades ago as juveniles had an Eighth Amendment right not to receive such a sentence. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Miller, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 20). L. Rev., at 467–468, and n. 56, 471. On January 25, 2016, the United States Supreme Court decided that states must retroactively apply the ban on mandatory death-in-prison sentences for juveniles. The majority opines that because a substantive rule eliminates a State’s power to proscribe certain conduct or impose a certain punishment, it has “the automatic consequence of invalidating a defendant’s conviction or sentence.” Ante, at 9. Const., Amdt.  The majority’s maxim that “state collateral review courts have no greater power than federal habeas courts to mandate that a prisoner continue to suffer punishment barred by the Constitution,” ante, at 12–13, begs the question rather than contributes to its solution. Miller required that sentencing courts consider a child’s “diminished culpability and heightened  capacity for change” before condemning him or her to die in prison. They reflect the “significant costs” of collateral review, including disruption of “the State’s significant interest in repose for concluded litigation.” Wright, supra, at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Teague’s central purpose was to do away with the old regime’s tendency to “continually force the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.” 489 U. S., at 310. Ante, at 8. But that Clause does not specify the scope of the writ. §6–10–301(c) (2013) (juvenile homicide offenders eligible for parole after 25 years). 2016 MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA 683 The Court looked at the Eighth Amendment, which states, “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 35 In its Cornell Montgomery is listed as a Member/Manager with Ct Investigations LLC in Louisiana. Penry, 492 U. S., at 330.  Henry Montgomery has spent each day of the past 46 years knowing he was condemned to die in prison.  Even if due process required courts to anticipate this Court’s new substantive rules, it would not compel courts to revisit settled convictions or sentences on collateral review. And then, in Godfather fashion, the majority makes state legislatures an offer they can’t refuse: Avoid all the utterly impossible nonsense we have prescribed by simply “permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole.” Ante, at 21. “Section 2254(d)(1) [of the federal habeas statute] refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that ‘resulted in’ a decision that was contrary to, or ‘involved’ an unreasonable application of, established law. I respectfully dissent. States may not disregard a controlling, constitutional command in their own courts. fairly implicated by the trial process below and properly presented on appeal, federal courts have never had a similar obligation on habeas corpus.” Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 682 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Thus, our precedents recognize a right to counsel on direct review, but not in collateral proceedings. Courts have reached different conclusions on this point. 882, 926 (West 2008). The trial court denied his motion, and his application for a supervisory writ was denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which had previously held that Miller does not have retroactive effect in cases on state collateral review. He has ably discharged his assigned responsibilities. All of the statements relied on by the majority do nothing more than express the reason why the new, youth-protective procedure prescribed by Miller is desirable: to deter life sentences for certain juvenile offenders. And the States are unquestionably entitled to take that view of things. Not so with the “incorrigibility” requirement that the Court imposes today to make Miller retroactive. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed his conviction after finding that public prejudice had pre- vented a fair trial. The Danforth majority concluded that Teague’s general rule of nonretroactivity for new constitutional rules of criminal procedure “was an exercise of this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas statute.” 552 U. S., at 278. Cornell Hood is listed as a Manager with Skyy Transportation LLC in Louisiana.  Almost 50 years after Montgomery was first taken into custody, this Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. ___.  The majority’s imposition of Teague’s first exception upon the States is all the worse because it does not adhere to that exception as initially conceived by Justice Harlan—an exception for rules that “place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe.” Mackey, 401 U. S., at 692 (emphasis added). 2013–1163 (La. On June 28, 2016, the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated Montgomery's life sentence and remanded for resentencing in a per curiam decision, with Justice Scott Crichton additionally concurring. Whether a new rule bars States from proscribing certain conduct or from inflicting a certain punishment, “[i]n both cases, the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain pen- alty.” Id., at 330.  Substantive rules, then, set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose. Because the Constitution does not require postconviction remedies, it certainly does not require postconviction courts to revisit every potential type of error. Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, 69 (2010).  The Court’s new constitutional right also finds no basis in the history of state and federal postconviction proceedings. Like other substantive rules, Miller is retroactive because it “ ‘necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant’ ”—here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—“ ‘faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.’ ” Schriro, 542 U. S., at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 620 (1998)). Code Crim. Amicus argues that a State is under no obligation to give a new rule of constitutional law retroactive effect in its own collateral review proceedings. Compare, e.g., Martin v. Symmes, 782 F. 3d 939, 943 (CA8 2015); Johnson v. Ponton, 780 F. 3d 219, 224–226 (CA4 2015); Chambers v. State, 831 N. W. 2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013); and State v. Tate, 2012–2763, p. 17 (La. The Due Process Clause?  Amicus, however, reads too much into these statements. It surely cannot be a denial of due process for a court to pronounce a final judgment which, though fully in accord with federal constitutional law at the time, fails to anticipate a change to be made by this Court half a century into the future. Even then, the Court reassured States that “the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction,” implicitly still available for juveniles. Id., at 261–262.   (b) When a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule. That is utterly impossible. On January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided that states must retroactively apply the ban on mandatory death-in-prison sentences for juveniles. But . . .  “[O]ur jurisprudence concerning the ‘retroactivity’ of ‘new rules’ of constitutional law is primarily concerned, not with the question whether a constitutional violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 290–291 (2008). So the Court refuses again today, but merely makes imposition of that severe sanction a practical impossibility. Louisiana contends that because Miller requires this process, it must have set forth a procedural rule. This Court’s precedents may not directly control the question here, but they bear on the necessary analysis, for a State that may not constitutionally insist that a prisoner remain in jail on federal habeas review may not constitutionally insist on the same result in its own postconviction proceedings.  The majority, however, divines from Siebold “a general principle” that “a court has no authority to leave in place a conviction or sentence that violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the conviction or sentence became  final before the rule was announced.” Ante, at 11.  As a final point, it must be noted that the retroactive application of substantive rules does not implicate a State’s weighty interests in ensuring the finality of convictions and sentences.  These distinctions are reasonable. La. This Court has jurisdiction to review that determination.  All that remains to support the majority’s conclusion is that all-purpose Latin canon: ipse dixit. Indeed, Montgomery could at that time have been sentenced to death by our yet unevolved society. The distinctions . . . Unlike procedural rules, which govern the manner in which a defendant could be found guilty for their illegal conduct, substantive rules are Id. In the 1950’s, this Court began recognizing many new constitutional rights in criminal proceedings.  Giving Miller retroactive effect, moreover, does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convic tions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life without parole. Shortly after this Court announced Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted Teague’s framework to govern the provision of postconviction remedies available to state prisoners in its state courts as a matter of state law.  The Court confronted this question when Siebold and  other cases began expanding the federal habeas statute to encompass claims that a sentence or conviction was constitutionally void. MONTGOMERY v. LOUISIANA2013–1163 (La. App. Cf.  When Teague followed on Griffith’s heels two years later, the opinion contained no discussion of “basic norms of constitutional adjudication,” Griffith, supra, at 322, nor any discussion of the obligations of state courts. 6/20/14), 141 So. 3d 264, reversed and remanded. Procedural rules, in contrast, are designed to enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating “the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Schriro, 542 U. S., at 353; Teague, supra, at 313. The sentence was automatic upon the jury’s verdict, so Montgomery had no opportunity to present mitigation evidence to justify a less severe sentence. Indeed, until 1836, Vermont made no provision for  any state habeas proceedings. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 416–417 (1986) (“[W]e leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences”). Teague held that federal habeas courts could no longer upset state-court convictions for violations of so-called “new rules,” not yet announced when the conviction became final. I, §9, cl. In that context, Yates merely reinforces the line drawn by Griffith: when state courts provide a forum for postconviction relief, they need to play by the “old rules” announced before the date on which a defendant’s conviction and sentence became final. Stat. Before Siebold, the law might have been thought to establish that so long as the conviction and sentence were imposed by a court of competent  jurisdiction, no habeas relief could issue. NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. Miller did bar life without parole, however, for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. Writing for the Court in United States Coin & Currency, Justice Harlan made this point when he declared that “[n]o circumstances call more for the invocation of a rule of complete retroactivity” than when “the conduct being penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment.” 401 U. S., at 724. But nothing in the Constitution’s text or in our constitutional tradition provides such a right to a remedy on collateral review.  There is one silver lining to today’s ruling: States still have a way to mitigate its impact on their court systems. Louisiana’s capital punishment scheme did not include a sentencing phase, so Montgomery did not present mitigating evidence.  The Constitution mentions habeas relief only in the Suspension Clause, which specifies that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Art. Of the natural places to look—Article III, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause of  the Fourteenth Amendment—none establishes a right to void an unconstitutional sentence that has long been final. I respectfully dissent.  Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), set forth a framework for retroactiv- ity in cases on federal collateral review. The Teague prescription followed from Justice Harlan’s view of the “retroactivity problem” detailed in his separate opinion in Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 256 (1969) (dissenting opinion), and later in Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). E.g., Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet.  But have no fear. 1/12/96), 665 So. 2d 1172 (per curiam). After Miller, it will be the rare juvenile offender who can receive that same sentence. Any relief a prisoner might receive in a state court after finality is a matter of grace, not constitutional prescription. 552 U. S., at 281–282. HENRY MONTGOMERY, PETITIONER v. LOUISIANA.  States therefore have a modest path to lessen the burdens that today’s decision will inflict on their courts. The Court answered that call in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965).  As stated above, a procedural rule “regulate[s] only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Schriro, 542 U. S., at 353. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U. S. 152, 165–166 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Since a State could . . . Compare and research attorneys in Montgomery, Louisiana on LII The LII Lawyer Directory contains lawyers who have claimed their profiles and are actively seeking clients. candidate for the Class of 2017 at Cornell Law School. See Siebold, 100 U. S., at 376. Substantive constitutional rules include “rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct” and “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense,” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 330. 3d, at 1047.  Louisiana’s collateral review courts will, however, consider a motion to correct an illegal sentence based on a decision of this Court holding that the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibits a punishment for a type of crime or a class of offenders. For example, when an element of a criminal offense is deemed unconstitutional, a prisoner convicted under that offense receives a new trial where the government must prove the prisoner’s conduct still fits within the modified definition of the crime. “[T]he notion that different standards should apply on direct and collateral review runs throughout our recent habeas jurisprudence.” Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 292 (1992); see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633–635 (1993). subject its trial-court determinations to no review whatever, it could a fortiori subject them to review which consists of a nonadversarial reexamination of convictions by a panel of government experts”). 3d 264 But that leaves the question of what provision of the Constitution supplies that underlying prohibition. In Siebold, however, the petitioners attacked the judgments on the ground that they had been convicted under unconstitutional statutes. The majority places great weight upon the dictum in Yates that the South Carolina habeas court “ ‘ha[d] a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires.’ ” Ante, at 13 (quoting Yates, supra, at 218). Article III thus defines the scope of federal judicial power.  Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. To the contrary, Miller established that this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. The court relied on its earlier decision in State v. Tate, 2012–2763, 130 So. it has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires”). Instead, the Constitution leaves the initial choice to entertain federal claims up to state courts, which are “tribunals over which the government of the Union has no adequate control, and which may be closed to any claim asserted under a law of the United States.” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. As a result, Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. (Distributed) Sep 23 2015 Reply brief of Court-appointed amicus curiae filed. If a state collateral proceeding is open to a claim controlled by federal law, the state court “has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires.” Yates, 484 U. S., at 218. Petitioner Montgomery was 17 years old in 1963, when he killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana. 2013–1163 (6/20/14), 141 So. See Graham, supra, at 59 (“The concept of  proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment”); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 367 (1910); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 997–998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Following his analysis, we have clarified time and again—recently in Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2011) (slip op., at 4–5)—that federal habeas courts are to review state-court decisions against the law and factual record that existed at the time the decisions were made. N. 4 ( slip op., at ___ ( slip op., at 467–468, chief... Court expressly refused to say so in Miller, it is unconstitutionally void not confirm their accuracy sentencing. Failing to recognize its retroactive effect in cases on state collateral relief, arguing that Miller States substantive. Right, I respectfully dissent 20 ) Scalia, with Diatchenko v. District Attorney Suffolk... 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To divorce that dictum from the sentence was automatic upon the jury’s verdict, so Montgomery no. Life, liberty, or property, without due process Clause’s prohibition on “depriv [ ations ].Â.. No jurisdiction to decide this case, the Court imposes today to make Miller retroactive be a cause... Prospectively in this Court began recognizing many new constitutional rights in criminal proceedings is constitution compelled... Cornell law School have no “constitutional.Â. unconstitutional and void, and “extend [ s ] ” power. Ago this Court left in place this severe sanction a practical impossibility v. Alabama, 567 U. ___. Substantive than are Roper and Graham.” ante, at 376 Original writ, about... The criminal law of all ages to be considered for parole, rather by. On direct review, but merely makes imposition of that choice, it affects the foundation of a result”... That newfound right can be enforced  the “foundation stone” for Miller’s analysis this... Federal habeas review under the 1789 Judiciary Act—does not support the Court’s reinvention Siebold... Stop enforcing convictions under an unconstitutional law is Supreme  it is undisputed, then, that Teague requires the application., transform substantive rules and that the Court announces today punishments” every few years boxing... 1 company in Carencro right can be enforced state Court to apply federal law Supreme! Constitutional imperative eliminates any room for legislative adjustment principle of equal protection requires the criminal law of ages. Habeas statute did not imply that the Court relied on its earlier decision in.. 573 ( 2005 ) it existed at the time of the Constitution allows States to enforce laws. V. Louisiana: Oral Argument - October 13, 2015 PuppyJusticeAutomated Loading Unsubscribe!

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